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Abstract		 Functional	magnetic	resonance	imaging	(fMRI)	has	begun	to	narrow	down	the	neural	correlates	of	self-generated	forms	of	thought,	with	current	evidence	pointing	toward	central	roles	for	the	default,	frontoparietal,	and	visual	networks.	Recent	work	has	linked	the	actual	arising	and	generation	of	thoughts	more	specifically	to	default	network	activity,	but	the	limited	temporal	resolution	of	fMRI	has	precluded	more	detailed	conclusions	about	where	in	the	brain	self-created	mental	content	is	generated	and	how	this	is	achieved.	Here	I	argue	that	the	unparalleled	spatiotemporal	resolution	of	intracranial	electrophysiology	(iEEG)	in	human	epilepsy	patients	can	begin	to	provide	answers	to	questions	about	the	specific	neural	origins	of	self-generated	thought.	I	review	the	extensive	body	of	literature	from	iEEG	studies	over	the	past	few	decades	and	show	that	many	studies	involving	passive	recording	or	direct	electrical	stimulation	throughout	the	brain	all	point	to	the	medial	temporal	lobe	as	a	key	site	of	thought-generation.	At	the	same	time,	null	effects	from	other	brain	regions	suggest	that	various	other	default	network	hubs,	such	as	the	posterior	cingulate	cortex	and	inferior	parietal	lobule,	might	have	only	a	marginal	role	(if	any)	in	the	self-generation	or	initiation	of	mental	content	like	dreams,	visual	imagery,	memories,	and	prospective	simulations.	Ultimately,	combining	a	variety	of	neuroscientific	methods	that	compensate	for	each	other’s	weaknesses	and	complement	each	other’s	strengths	may	prove	to	be	the	most	effective	way	to	understand	the	brain’s	remarkable	ability	to	decouple	from	the	immediate	environment	and	generate	its	own	experiences.	
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Introduction	An	enormous	amount	of	scientific	interest	has	recently	begun	to	focus	on	spontaneous	and	self-generated	forms	of	thought	(Andrews-Hanna,	Smallwood,	&	Spreng,	2014;	Christoff,	2012;	Christoff,	Irving,	Fox,	Spreng,	&	Andrews-Hanna,	2016;	Seli,	Risko,	Smilek,	&	Schacter,	2016).	As	experience	sampling	studies	(see	Stawarczyk,	this	volume)	and	questionnaires	develop	an	understanding	of	the	associated	subjective	content	(Delamillieure	et	al.,	2010;	Diaz	et	al.,	2013;	Fox,	Nijeboer,	Solomonova,	Domhoff,	&	Christoff,	2013;	Fox,	Thompson,	Andrews-Hanna,	&	Christoff,	2014;	Stawarczyk,	2017;	Stawarczyk,	Majerus,	Maj,	Van	der	Linden,	&	D'Argembeau,	2011),	functional	neuroimaging	research	over	the	past	two	decades	has	delineated	a	rough	but	increasingly	refined	picture	of	general	brain	recruitment	associated	with	these	self-generated	forms	of	thought	(Fox,	Spreng,	Ellamil,	Andrews-Hanna,	&	Christoff,	2015).	Throughout	this	chapter,	by	‘self-generated	thought’	I	will	simply	mean	mental	content	that	is	relatively	independent	of	and	unrelated	to	the	immediate	sensory	environment	(Andrews-Hanna	et	al.,	2014;	Fox,	Andrews-Hanna,	&	Christoff,	2016);	taken	broadly,	self-generated	thought	includes	mental	processes	such	as	stimulus-independent	thought	(McGuire,	Paulesu,	Frackowiak,	&	Frith,	1996),	task-unrelated	thought	(Dumontheil,	Gilbert,	Frith,	&	Burgess,	2010),	spontaneous	thought	(Spiers	&	Maguire,	2006),	mind-wandering	(Christoff,	Gordon,	Smallwood,	Smith,	&	Schooler,	2009),	creative	thinking	and	insight	(Ellamil,	Dobson,	Beeman,	&	Christoff,	2012),	and	dreaming	(Fox	et	al.,	2013).		Now	that	a	general	picture	of	the	subjective	content	and	neural	correlates	of	self-generated	thought	is	emerging,	deeper	and	more	subtle	questions	are	being	posed:	for	instance,	whether	specific	neural	correlates	are	associated	with	specific	self-generated	
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content	(Gorgolewski	et	al.,	2014;	Tusche,	Smallwood,	Bernhardt,	&	Singer,	2014);	whether	differences	in	brain	morphology	are	associated	with	individual	tendencies	toward	certain	types	of	self-generated	thinking	(Bernhardt	et	al.,	2014;	Golchert	et	al.,	2017);	what	the	relationship	of	self-generated	thought	is	to	various	psychiatric	and	neurodegenerative	conditions	(Christoff	et	al.,	2016);	and	whether	specific	neural	origin	sites	of	self-generated	thought	can	be	identified	(Fox	et	al.,	2016).	It	is	this	final	question	that	I	will	focus	on	throughout	this	chapter:	what	brain	structures	are	the	primary	initiators,	drivers,	and	creators	when	the	brain	decouples	from	its	sensory	environment	and	self-generates	its	own	experiences?	Is	this	question	even	valid?	Can	there	be	a	specific	answer?		First,	I	will	very	briefly	review	what	is	known	about	the	broad	neural	correlates	of	self-generated	thought	from	functional	neuroimaging	investigations.	These	studies	point	to	the	primacy	of	the	default	network	in	initiating	self-generated	thought,	but	cannot	seem	to	go	beyond	this	level	of	specificity	and	offer	a	more	detailed	answer	due	to	their	inherently	poor	temporal	resolution.	Next,	I	will	delve	into	the	relatively	smaller	(but	fast-growing)	human	intracranial	electrophysiology	literature	to	explore	the	neural	origins	of	self-generated	thought	in	more	detail.	Starting	with	the	broad	set	of	regions	identified	by	functional	neuroimaging	as	being	involved	in	self-generating	thought,	I	synthesize	data	from	human	electrophysiology	to	hone	in	on	the	most	likely	origin/initiation	sites	and	to	tentatively	exclude	other	areas	from	a	primary	generative	role.	
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Functional	neuroimaging	of	self-generated	thought:	The	importance	of	default	
network	regions	Non-invasive	neuroimaging	modalities,	particularly	functional	magnetic	resonance	imaging	(fMRI),	have	been	instrumental	in	exploring	the	broad	neural	correlates	and	large-scale	network	dynamics	associated	with	self-generated	forms	of	thought	(Beaty,	Benedek,	Silvia,	&	Schacter,	2016;	Christoff	et	al.,	2016;	Ellamil	et	al.,	2016;	Fox	et	al.,	2013;	Fox	et	al.,	2015;	Zabelina	&	Andrews-Hanna,	2016).	A	recent	quantitative	meta-analysis	of	neuroimaging	studies	investigating	various	forms	of	self-generated	thought	(including	mind-wandering,	stimulus-independent	thought,	and	spontaneous	mentalizing)	found	that	a	wide	variety	of	brain	regions	appear	to	be	recruited	by	these	processes,	including	multiple	nodes	of	the	default,	frontoparietal,	and	visual	networks	(Fox	et	al.,	2015;	Fig.	1).	Although	this	meta-analysis	demonstrated	the	importance	of	brain	regions	and	networks	beyond	the	default	network	to	self-generated	thought,	it	was	unable	to	answer	more	specific	questions	about	the	functional	roles	of	each	network,	or	of	their	temporal	primacy	in	initiating	self-generated	forms	of	thinking.	Two	specific	neuroimaging	studies	of	the	origins	of	self-generated	thought	are	interesting	not	only	for	the	light	they	shed	on	this	problem,	but	also	because	they	exemplify	the	limitations	of	fMRI	when	it	comes	to	identifying	specific	neural	origin	sites.	Briefly,	these	studies	point	to	the	involvement	of	default	network	regions	in	the	initial	self-generation	of	thought,	but	have	not	been	able	to	identify	which	specific	components	of	the	network	are	most	important.		
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Figure	1.	Meta-analysis	of	brain	areas	consistently	recruited	by	self-generated	forms	of	thought.	
Meta-analytic	clusters	indicating	brain	regions	consistently	recruited	across	various	forms	of	spontaneous	and	self-generated	thought.	Outline	of	the	frontoparietal	(red)	and	default	(blue)	networks	are	shown	for	comparison.	Reproduced	with	permission	from	Fox	et	al.	(2015).		 First,	a	study	by	Ellamil	and	colleagues	in	2012	recruited	visual	artists	at	a	local	fine	arts	university	to	create	visual	art	while	in	the	scanner	using	an	MRI-compatible	drawing	tablet	and	pen	(Ellamil	et	al.,	2012).	The	artists	were	then	asked	to	reflect	on	and	evaluate	the	quality	of	the	artwork	they	had	created.	The	‘generation’	phase	of	artwork	creation	was	contrasted	with	a	control	condition	where	the	artists	simply	traced	the	pen	around	the	drawing	tablet,	therefore	controlling	for	motor	effects	associated	with	the	act	of	drawing	itself.	Among	the	residual	activations,	associated	with	the	process	of	generating	the	artistic	
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ideas	themselves,	recruitment	was	observed	in	the	medial	temporal	lobe	(including	hippocampus	and	parahippocampus),	inferior	and	superior	parietal	lobule,	premotor	areas,	and	other	regions	(Fig.	2).	This	study	helped	narrow	down	the	possible	regions	implicated	in	self-generation	of	creative	ideas,	but	nonetheless	the	widespread	recruitment	observed	made	it	difficult	to	determine	which	regions,	if	any,	were	specifically	involved	in	generating	creative	thoughts,	vs.	recruited	shortly	thereafter	to	participate	in	this	generation	process	or	its	communication	to	other	brain	regions.	(Note	that	a	similar	emphasis	on	the	role	of	the	default	network	in	creative	generation	has	been	found	in	a	recent	study	involving	participants	generating	poetry,	as	opposed	to	visual	artwork	(Liu	et	al.,	2015).)		
Figure	2.	Brain	regions	recruited	during	self-generation	of	creative	ideas.	
	Activations	throughout	the	brain	during	the	generation	of	visual	artwork.	Numbers	indicate	z-coordinates	in	MNI	space.	Reproduced	with	permission	from	Ellamil	et	al.	(2012).	HPC:	hippocampus;	IPL:	inferior	parietal	lobule;	PHC:	parahippocampus;	PMA:	premotor	area.			 A	related	study	examined	brain	activation	surrounding	the	spontaneous	arising	of	everyday	thoughts	when	participants’	minds	wandered	while	in	the	MRI	scanner	(Ellamil	et	al.,	2016).	The	participants	were	highly-experienced	mindfulness	meditation	practitioners	accustomed	to	monitoring	the	arising	of	distracting	thoughts	and	identifying	their	contents.	While	they	practiced	mindful	attention	to	their	breathing,	they	indicated	
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with	a	button	press	when	they	noticed	the	arising	of	a	spontaneous,	unbidden	thought	into	consciousness.	The	time-course	of	brain	recruitment	before,	during,	and	after	this	button	press	was	then	examined	in	detail.	When	these	time-courses	were	explored,	it	was	found	that	certain	brain	regions	showed	peaks	of	activation	slightly	before	the	subjective	awareness	of	a	thought	(as	indicated	by	the	button	press;	see	Fig.	3).	Various	other	regions	showed	peak	activations	that	either	coincided	with	the	button	press,	or	followed	it	(only	figures	for	peak	activations	prior	to	arising	thoughts	are	shown	here;	for	details	of	later	activation	peaks,	see	the	original	figures	in	Ellamil	et	al.	[2016]).	Regions	showing	peak	activation	antecedent	to	the	arising	of	thought	included	the	medial	temporal	lobe	bilaterally,	the	inferior	parietal	lobule,	the	posterior	cingulate	cortex,	and	others	(Fig.	3).		Notably,	almost	all	of	these	regions	are	considered	components	of	a	broadly	defined	default	network	(Buckner,	Andrews-Hanna,	&	Schacter,	2008;	Raichle	et	al.,	2001),	which	(as	noted	above)	is	widely	agreed	to	be	essential	to	self-generated	and	self-referential	cognitive	activity	(Fox	et	al.,	2015;	Northoff	et	al.,	2006;	Stawarczyk	&	D'Argembeau,	2015).	Beyond	this	focus	on	the	default	network,	however,	the	coarse	temporal	resolution	of	fMRI	was	unable	to	differentiate	between	the	regions	showing	antecedent	activations,	leaving	important	questions	unanswered.	Are	these	various	default	network	or	other	regions	equally	involved	in	generating	mental	content	–	or	might	their	dispersed	but	synchronized	activity	(functional	connectivity)	be	the	explanation?	Or	are	specific	areas	preferentially	involved	in	generating	novel	patterns	of	brain	activity	corresponding	to	self-generated	mental	content?		
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Figure	3.	Timecourse	of	brain	regions	where	activation	peaks	just	prior	to	awareness	of	spontaneously	arising	of	thoughts.	
  
 Brain	regions	where	activation	peaked	prior	to	the	conscious	awareness	of	a	spontaneous	thought	arising	(as	indicated	by	the	button-press	icon).	Note	that	although	the	results	suggest	an	important	role	for	the	medial	temporal	lobe,	the	temporal	resolution	of	fMRI	could	not	distinguish	these	early	activations	from	those	in	other	brain	regions,	such	as	the	posterior	cingulate	cortex	and	rostral	anterior	cingulate.	Reproduced	with	permission	from	Ellamil	et	al.	(2016).	
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Where	are	thoughts	generated	in	the	brain?	Insights	from	human	intracranial	
electrophysiology	Direct	recording	of	the	electrical	activity	produced	by	single	neurons	and	neuronal	populations	provides	unparalleled	spatial	and	temporal	resolution	(at	the	scale	of	single	neurons	and	in	the	millisecond	range)	(Fried,	Rutishauser,	Cerf,	&	Kreiman,	2014;	Suthana	&	Fried,	2012).	By	directly	recording	the	brain’s	electrical	activity,	be	it	summation	of	input	signals	(potentials	in	the	dendrites	and	soma),	or	action	potentials	carrying	a	neuron’s	output	signals	(‘spikes’),	many	of	the	pitfalls	and	uncertainties	of	the	indirect	measures	used	in	functional	neuroimaging,	such	as	blood-oxygen-level-dependent	(BOLD)	signal,	can	be	avoided	(Logothetis,	2008).	An	additional	advantage	is	that	current	can	also	be	‘injected’	(passed	through	electrodes	on	the	cortical	surface	or	at	depth	in	the	brain),	allowing	direct	electrical	stimulation	of	tissue	throughout	the	central	nervous	system.	Instead	of	aiming	to	evoke	brain	activity	(and	then	record	it)	using	particular	tasks,	sensory	stimuli,	or	behaviors,	the	brain	can	be	directly	stimulated	and	the	resulting	sensory,	cognitive,	motor,	or	emotional	effects	observed	and	correlated	with	the	precise	site	of	stimulation	(Penfield	&	Boldrey,	1937;	Selimbeyoglu	&	Parvizi,	2010).	Additionally,	with	multiple	simultaneous	electrode	sites,	responses	evoked	in	response	to	stimulation	at	a	given	site	can	also	be	investigated	(Keller	et	al.,	2014;	Matsumoto	et	al.,	2004).		 Because	of	the	invasiveness	of	implanted	electrodes,	such	research	cannot	be	conducted	in	healthy	human	participants.	In	some	cases	of	serious	neurological	conditions,	however,	including	medication-resistant	epilepsy	and	Parkinson’s	disease	(Bechtereva	&	Abdullaev,	2000;	Lachaux,	Rudrauf,	&	Kahane,	2003),	electrical	stimulation	of	the	cortical	surface	or	implantation	of	depth	electrodes	into	deeper	cortical	and	subcortical	structures	
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may	be	indicated	in	human	patients	by	clinical	criteria	and	protocols	(Engel,	Moll,	Fried,	&	Ojemann,	2005;	Suthana	&	Fried,	2012).	In	addition	to	providing	ever-improving	clinical	benefits	for	these	various	conditions	(Hill	et	al.,	2017;	Spencer,	Spencer,	Williamson,	&	Mattson,	1990;	Spencer,	Spencer,	Williamson,	&	Mattson,	1982),	intracranial	electrodes	provide	an	unparalleled	opportunity	to	investigate	human	brain	function	at	very	high	spatiotemporal	resolution.		 In	many	ways,	human	cognitive	electrophysiology	remains	in	its	infancy.	Nonetheless,	the	collective	results	of	such	investigations	in	humans	have	provided	unprecedented	insights	into	the	understanding	of	somatosensory	and	motor	systems	(Penfield	&	Boldrey,	1937;	Penfield	&	Welch,	1951),	visual	perception	(Fried,	MacDonald,	&	Wilson,	1997;	Kreiman,	Koch,	&	Fried,	2000a;	Quiroga,	Reddy,	Kreiman,	Koch,	&	Fried,	2005),	memory	(Burke	et	al.,	2014;	Gelbard-Sagiv,	Mukamel,	Harel,	Malach,	&	Fried,	2008;	Lega,	Jacobs,	&	Kahana,	2012),	spatial	mapping	and	navigation	(Ekstrom	et	al.,	2003;	Jacobs,	Kahana,	Ekstrom,	Mollison,	&	Fried,	2010),	mathematical	cognition	(Daitch	et	al.,	2016),	visual	imagery	(Kreiman,	Koch,	&	Fried,	2000b),	and	even	consciousness	(Quiroga,	Mukamel,	Isham,	Malach,	&	Fried,	2008).		This	seminal	work	has	only	touched	on	what	is	possible,	however	–	particularly	with	respect	to	higher-order	cognitive-affective	processes	that	are	difficult,	if	not	impossible,	to	study	in	animal	models.	One	such	process	is	the	self-generation	of	mental	content	by	the	human	brain,	the	central	concern	of	this	Handbook.	Although	no	known	human	electrophysiology	has	directly	explored	mental	states	such	as	mind-wandering,	nonetheless	many	investigations	have	explored	related	phenomena,	for	instance	spontaneous	memory	recall	(Gelbard-Sagiv	et	al.,	2008)	and	immersive,	dream-like	experiences	(Vignal,	Maillard,	
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McGonigal,	&	Chauvel,	2007).	Moreover,	an	increasing	number	of	such	studies	have	investigated	default	network	hubs;	given	this	network’s	acknowledged	importance	for	self-generated	thought	(Fox	et	al.,	2015),	electrophysiological	studies	of	these	areas	in	humans	are	of	great	interest.	As	we	shall	see,	stimulation	and	recording	experiments	in	default	network	hubs	can	also	be	very	informative	even	when	null	results	are	obtained.		 In	attempting	to	discern	origin	sites	responsible	for	creating	self-generated	mental	content,	both	‘positive’	and	‘negative’	evidence	is	valuable.	By	‘positive’	evidence	we	mean	that	which	directly	links	activity	in	a	given	brain	area	to	the	subjective	experience	of	self-generated	mental	content:	for	instance,	electrical	stimulation	of	the	medial	temporal	lobe,	as	well	as	spontaneous	electrical	discharges	therein,	are	both	frequently	associated	with	dream-like,	hallucinated	experiences	(Fox	et	al.,	2016;	Selimbeyoglu	&	Parvizi,	2010;	Vignal	et	al.,	2007),	and	spontaneous	recall	of	episodic	memories	is	directly	preceded	by	elevated	firing	rates	in	medial	temporal	lobe	neurons	(Gelbard-Sagiv	et	al.,	2008).	Conversely,	‘negative’	evidence	accrues	when	stimulation	and/or	spontaneous	discharges	fail	to	result	in	such	subjective	experiences,	or	sometimes	any	experiences	whatsoever	(null	results):	for	instance,	hundreds	of	stimulations	to	the	posteromedial	cortex	in	humans	have	failed	to	reliably	elicit	any	noticeable	subjective	effects,	including	self-generated	thought	(Foster	&	Parvizi,	2017),	despite	the	importance	of	this	area	to	the	default	network	(Greicius,	Krasnow,	Reiss,	&	Menon,	2003;	Raichle	et	al.,	2001;	Yeo	et	al.,	2011)	and	self-generated	thought	(Fox	et	al.,	2015;	Stawarczyk	&	D'Argembeau,	2015).	In	the	following	sections,	we	summarize	what	has	been	learned	from	human	electrical	brain	stimulation	studies	about	which	regions	appear	to	be	likely	thought-generation	or	-initiation	sites,	and	which	regions	do	not.	
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Table	1.			Summary	of	human	electrophysiology	studies	demonstrating	elicitation	of	memories,	thoughts,	or	hallucinatory,	dream-like	experiences.	
Brain	Region	 Stimulations/	discharges	elicitinga		
Total	stimulations/	
discharges	 Percentage	eliciting		 References	
Temporal	Lobe	
Hippocampus	 25	 46	 54%	
(Bancaud,	Brunet-Bourgin,	Chauvel,	&	Halgren,	1994;	Fish,	Gloor,	Quesney,	&	Oliver,	1993;	Halgren,	Walter,	Cherlow,	&	Crandall,	1978;	Kahane,	Hoffmann,	Minotti,	&	Berthoz,	2003;	Mulak,	Kahane,	Hoffmann,	Minotti,	&	Bonaz,	2008;	Vignal	et	al.,	2007)	
Amygdala	 13	 36	 36%	 (Ferguson	et	al.,	1969;	Fish	et	al.,	1993;	Halgren	et	al.,	1978;	Vignal	et	al.,	2007)	
Parahippocampal	region	 9	 16	 56%	 (Feindel	&	Penfield,	1954;	Penfield	&	Perot,	1963;	Vignal	et	al.,	2007)	
Temporopolar	cortex	 5	 11	 45%	
(Bancaud	et	al.,	1994;	Halgren	et	al.,	1978;	Mulak	et	al.,	2008;	Ostrowsky,	Desestret,	Ryvlin,	Coste,	&	Mauguière,	2002;	Penfield	&	Perot,	1963)	Inferior	temporal	gyrus	 1	 21	 5%	 (Penfield	&	Perot,	1963)	
Middle	temporal	gyrus	 7	 42	 17%	 (Kahane	et	al.,	2003;	Mullan	&	Penfield,	1959;	Penfield,	1958;	Penfield	&	Perot,	1963)	
Superior	temporal	gyrus	 24	 99	 24%	 (Morris,	Luders,	Lesser,	Dinner,	&	Hahn,	1984;	Mullan	&	Penfield,	1959;	Penfield	&	Perot,	1963)	
Temporo-occipital	junction	 4	 17	 24%	 (Lee,	Hong,	Seo,	Tae,	&	Hong,	2000;	Morris	et	al.,	1984;	Penfield	&	Perot,	1963)	
Frontal	Lobe	Inferior	frontal	gyrus	 1	 7	 14%	 (Blanke,	Landis,	&	Seeck,	2000)	Middle	frontal	gyrus	 2	 8	 25%	 (Blanke,	Landis,	et	al.,	2000)	Orbitofrontal	cortex	 1	 4	 25%	 (Mahl,	Rothenberg,	Delgado,	&	Hamlin,	1964)	Supplementary	motor	area	 1	 6	 17%	 (Beauvais,	Biraben,	Seigneuret,	Saïkali,	&	Scarabin,	2005)	
Parietal	Lobe	
Inferior	parietal	lobule	 2	 42	 5%	 (Blanke,	Perrig,	Thut,	Landis,	&	Seeck,	2000;	Schulz,	Woermann,	&	Ebner,	2007)	Posteromedial	cortex	(including	posterior	cingulate	cortex)	 0	 248	 0%	 (Foster	&	Parvizi,	2017)	
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Based	on	data	in	Supplementary	Table	1	in	the	comprehensive	review	conducted	by	Selimbeyoglu	&	Parvizi	(2010).	Updated	from	a	previously	published	table	(Fox	et	al.,	2016).	Data	for	brain	areas	with	≥10	stimulations/discharges	reported	in	the	literature	are	visualized	in	Fig.	4.	The	null	effects	in	posteromedial	cortex	are	included	because	of	its	inherent	interest	as	a	major	default	network	hub. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.	Preferential	involvement	of	medial	temporal	lobe	structures	and	temporopolar	cortex	in	electrophysiological	stimulations	(or	spontaneous	discharges)	eliciting	memories,	thoughts,	or	hallucinatory,	dream-like	experiences. 
 
 
 Percentage	of	stimulations	or	spontaneous	discharges	that	elicited	a	first-person	experience	of	memories,	thoughts,	or	hallucinatory,	dream-like	experiences,	based	on	more	than	100	independent	investigations.	Not	shown	are	data	for	hundreds	of	other	stimulations	throughout	the	brain,	for	which	no	such	thought-	or	dream-like	experiences	have	ever	been	reported.	Only	brain	areas	with	≥10	stimulations	or	discharges	reported	in	the	literature	are	visualized.	Drawn	from	data	in	our	Table	1,	based	on	data	in	Supplementary	Table	1	of	the	comprehensive	review	of	Selimbeyoglu	&	Parvizi	(2010);	updated	and	modified	based	on	our	previously	published	figure	(Fox	et	al.,	2016).	HPC:	hippocampus;	IPL:	inferior	parietal	lobule;	ITG:	inferior	temporal	gyrus;	MTG:	middle	temporal	gyrus;	PHC:	parahippocampal	cortex;	PMC:	posteromedial	cortex;	STG:	superior	temporal	gyrus;	TOJ:	temporo-occipital	junction;	TPC:	temporopolar	cortex.		
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Positive	evidence:	The	importance	of	the	medial	temporal	lobe	and	temporopolar	cortex	in	
initiating	self-generated	thought	
	
Medial	temporal	lobe.	The	most	substantial	evidence	to	date	points	to	the	medial	temporal	lobe	as	a	primary	(if	not	the	only)	origin	site	for	self-generating	mental	content	of	various	kinds.	Electrical	brain	stimulation	to	both	the	hippocampus	(Bancaud	et	al.,	1994;	Fish	et	al.,	1993;	Halgren	et	al.,	1978;	Kahane	et	al.,	2003;	Mulak	et	al.,	2008;	Vignal	et	al.,	2007)	and	parahippocampal	region	(Feindel	&	Penfield,	1954;	Penfield	&	Perot,	1963;	Vignal	et	al.,	2007)	elicit	subjective	experiences	akin	to	self-generated	thought	more	than	half	of	the	time	(according	to	reports	in	the	existing	literature)	(Table	1;	Fig.	4)	–	considerably	more	often	than	any	other	area	studied	to	date,	with	the	possible	exception	of	the	temporopolar	cortex	(discussed	in	the	next	section).	These	experiences	include	memory	recall	(Penfield	&	Perot,	1963),	visual	hallucinations	(Halgren	et	al.,	1978;	Kahane	et	al.,	2003;	Penfield	&	Perot,	1963;	Vignal	et	al.,	2007),	and	dreaming	(Halgren	et	al.,	1978;	Vignal	et	al.,	2007).			 Stimulation	of	the	amygdala	also	elicits	such	subjective	experiences	in	about	one	third	of	cases	(Table	1;	Fig.	4).	This	fact	is	intriguing	because	the	amygdala	is	the	only	subcortical	structure	reported	to	regularly	elicit	self-generated	thought	(Fig.	4).	Stimulation	of	other	subcortical	structures,	such	as	the	thalamus,	globus	pallidus,	and	subthalamic	nucleus	results	in	a	variety	of	interesting	effects,	but	none	of	them	bear	much	resemblance	to	self-generated	thought	the	way	we	have	defined	it	(Selimbeyoglu	&	Parvizi,	2010).	Similar	to	the	cortical	medial	temporal	lobe	structures,	stimulation	of	amygdala	can	elicit	long-term	memory	recall	(Fish	et	al.,	1993;	Vignal	et	al.,	2007),	out-of-body	
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experiences	(Vignal	et	al.,	2007),	visual	hallucinations	(Fish	et	al.,	1993),	and	dreams	(Vignal	et	al.,	2007).		
Temporopolar	cortex.	Although	reports	of	stimulation	to	the	temporopolar	cortex	are	relatively	rare,	about	half	of	these	stimulations	have	resulted	in	subjective	experiences	resembling	self-generated	thought	(Bancaud	et	al.,	1994;	Halgren	et	al.,	1978;	Mulak	et	al.,	2008;	Ostrowsky	et	al.,	2002;	Penfield	&	Perot,	1963).	As	with	the	medial	temporal	lobe,	stimulation	can	elicit	visual	hallucinations	(Bancaud	et	al.,	1994;	Halgren	et	al.,	1978;	Penfield	&	Perot,	1963),	memories	(Bancaud	et	al.,	1994),	and	other	thoughts	(Ostrowsky	et	al.,	2002).	Although	this	high	rate	of	elicitation	of	self-generated	mental	content	is	suggestive,	far	too	few	stimulations	have	been	conducted	for	any	firm	conclusions	to	be	drawn.	Further	stimulations	of	temporopolar	cortex	alongside	reports	of	subjective	experiences	would	be	highly	valuable	to	a	deeper	understanding	of	its	role	in	self-generated	thought	(see	also	Discussion,	below).	
	
Other	regions.	There	is	also	limited	evidence	for	the	importance	of	other	regions,	most	notably	the	middle	temporal	gyrus	(Kahane	et	al.,	2003;	Mullan	&	Penfield,	1959;	Penfield,	1958;	Penfield	&	Perot,	1963),	superior	temporal	gyrus	(Morris	et	al.,	1984;	Mullan	&	Penfield,	1959;	Penfield	&	Perot,	1963),	and	temporo-occipital	junction	(Lee	et	al.,	2000;	Morris	et	al.,	1984;	Penfield	&	Perot,	1963).	Isolated	reports	of	experiences	such	as	complex	visual	hallucinations	elicited	by	stimulation	of	the	frontal	lobe	are	also	interesting	(Blanke,	Landis,	et	al.,	2000;	Blanke,	Perrig,	et	al.,	2000).	Because	the	evidence	in	these	cases	is	much	more	marginal,	we	do	not	discuss	them	further	here,	but	suffice	to	say	that	
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the	book	is	hardly	closed	on	the	involvement	of	other	brain	areas	in	self-generating	mental	content.	Further	details	of	these	isolated	reports	can	be	found	in	Table	1	and	Figure	4.	Also	important	is	the	general	dearth	of	stimulation	to	subcortical	areas	reported	in	the	literature:	more	information	about	subjective	effects	of	stimulation	to	the	brainstem,	cerebellum,	and	other	subcortical	regions	would	be	a	welcome	addition	to	the	literature.	For	a	comprehensive	review	of	subjective	effects	elicited	by	stimulation	of	subcortical	structures,	see	the	review	by	Selimbeyoglu	and	Pariviz	(2010).	
	
	
Negative	evidence:	Marginal	roles	for	posteromedial	cortex	and	inferior	parietal	lobule	in	
initiating	self-generated	thought	
	
Posteromedial	cortex.	The	broad	area	designated	as	posteromedial	cortex	(Parvizi,	Van	Hoesen,	Buckwalter,	&	Damasio,	2006),	including	posterior	cingulate	cortex	(BA	23/31),	precuneus	(BA	7),	and	retrosplenial	cortex	(BA	29/30),	is	another	likely	candidate	area	for	initial	generation	of	thought	content.	Posteromedial	cortex	is	hypothesized	to	play	a	key	role	in	initiating	or	facilitating	memory	recall	(Shannon	&	Buckner,	2004),	and	memory	recall	and	recombination	represent	a	considerable	proportion	of	self-generated	thought	(Andrews-Hanna,	Reidler,	Huang,	&	Buckner,	2010;	Fox	et	al.,	2013;	Stawarczyk,	2017).	The	posterior	cingulate	cortex	is	consistently	recruited	during	various	forms	of	self-generated	thought	(Fox	et	al.,	2015;	Stawarczyk	&	D'Argembeau,	2015),	and	there	is	evidence	from	fMRI	that	activity	there	peaks	in	the	2	s	time	window	during	which		spontaneous	thoughts	appear	to	be	arising	((Ellamil	et	al.,	2016);	Fig.	3).	Moreover,	
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intracranial	electrophysiological	studies	in	humans	have	shown	that	distinct	neuronal	populations	in	the	posterior	cingulate	show	elevated	high-gamma-band	activity	both	at	rest	and	during	self-referential	thinking	(Dastjerdi	et	al.,	2011).	Despite	these	promising	features,	however,	the	evidence	to	date	from	intracranial	electrophysiological	investigations	in	humans	argues	against	any	causal	role	for	the	posterior	cingulate	cortex,	as	well	as	adjacent	retrosplenial	cortex,	in	generating	or	initiating	mental	content.	The	most	comprehensive	study	of	this	region	to	date	was	published	only	recently	(Foster	&	Parvizi,	2017).	Exhaustively	cataloguing	more	than	800	electrical	stimulations	throughout	medial	posterior	brain	regions	across	25	epilepsy	patients,	Foster	and	Parvizi	(2017)	found	that	stimulation	to	centrally-located	posteromedial	brain	regions	never	yielded	subjective	experiences	or	disturbances	of	any	kind,	unless	stimulations	were	executed	on	dorsal	or	ventral	border	regions	(Fig.	5).		A	possible	exception	to	these	results	should	be	mentioned:	a	single-patient	case	study	recently	reported	that	electrical	stimulation	of	the	posterior	cingulate	cortex	disconnects	consciousness	from	the	external	environment	and	results	in	subjective	experiences	of	‘dreaming’	(Herbet	et	al.,	2014).	If	correct,	these	findings	could	suggest	that	posterior	cingulate	cortex,	too,	could	be	considered	a	powerful	initiatory/generative	site	for	self-generated	thought	(the	authors’	interpretation	of	their	findings,	conversely,	is	that	electrical	stimulation	‘disrupts’	the	posterior	cingulate	cortex	connectivity	which	underlies	conscious	attention	to	the	external	world,	thus	making	room	for	internally-generated,	dream-like	experiences).	There	are	important	limitations	to	this	study,	however,	that	render	either	interpretation	unlikely.	The	central	concern	is	that	electrical	brain	stimulation	was	delivered	not	to	the	grey	matter	of	the	posterior	cingulate	cortex,	but	
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instead	to	the	underlying	white	matter	(in	the	posterior	part	of	the	cingulum;	see	their	Fig.	2a).	The	authors’	interpretations	of	their	findings,	which	focus	on	discussion	of	the	posterior	cingulate	cortex,	are	problematic	given	that	stimulation	was	in	fact	delivered	to	a	white	matter	pathway	known	to	project	widely	throughout	the	brain	(Schmahmann	et	al.,	2007;	Wakana,	Jiang,	Nagae-Poetscher,	Van	Zijl,	&	Mori,	2004).	Indeed,	the	cingulum	is	especially	problematic	in	this	respect	because	two	of	its	main	projections	are	to	medial	prefrontal	cortex	and	medial	temporal	lobe,	both	of	which	are	strongly	recruited	during	waking	mind-wandering	or	‘daydreaming’	(Ellamil	et	al.,	2016;	Fox	et	al.,	2015)	and	REM	sleep,	where	dreaming	usually	occurs	(Domhoff	&	Fox,	2015;	Fox	et	al.,	2013).	Although	the	authors	argue	that	the	partial	excision	of	the	cingulum	in	their	patient	makes	downstream	stimulation	an	unlikely	explanation	(Herbet	et	al.,	2014),	nonetheless	their	results	are	very	reminiscent	of	studies	that	delivered	current	directly	to	the	medial	temporal	lobe	and	elicited	dream-like	experiences	and	dreamy	states	(Bancaud	et	al.,	1994;	Halgren	et	al.,	1978;	Penfield	&	Perot,	1963;	Vignal	et	al.,	2007).	To	summarize,	the	authors	interpret	their	findings	as	related	to	posterior	cingulate	cortex	function,	whereas	their	paradigm	involved	stimulation	of	a	major	fiber	pathway	also	connected	to	medial	prefrontal	cortex	and	medial	temporal	lobe,	both	of	which	appear	to	be	directly	involved	in	the	creation	of	dreamy	states	and	other	forms	of	self-generated	thought	(Domhoff	&	Fox,	2015;	Ellamil	et	al.,	2016;	Fox	et	al.,	2013;	Fox	et	al.,	2015).	Moreover,	their	localization	of	the	stimulation	electrodes	appears	to	have	been	based	on	visual	assessment	during	surgery,	as	opposed	to	a	more	reliable	localization	based	on	CT	or	MRI	scans	in	patients.	Given	these	limitations,	this	single-subject	case	study	is	insufficient	to	outweigh	the	results	of	some	25	patients	where	
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hundreds	of	stimulations	to	the	posteromedial	cortex	yielded	no	such	effects	(Foster	&	Parvizi,	2017).		
Figure	5.	Null	effects	of	electrical	brain	stimulation	in	the	posteromedial	cortex	default	network	hub.	
	Summary	figure	showing	subjective	effects	produced	by	electrical	brain	stimulation	of	various	regions	of	the	medial	posterior	portions	of	cerebral	cortex.	More	dorsal	stimulations	preferentially	evoke	motor	effects	(red	circles),	and	more	ventral	stimulations	largely	evoke	visual	effects	(green	circles).	Some	248	stimulations	of	more	central	regions,	however	(white	circles),	corresponding	closely	to	a	major	hub	of	the	default	network	and	overlapping	with	numerous	regions	known	to	be	recruited	by	self-generated	thought	(cf.	Fig.	1),	resulted	in	no	discernible	subjective	effects	of	any	kind.	Reproduced	with	permission	from	Foster	&	Parvizi	(2017).	
	
	
Inferior	parietal	lobule.	Despite	its	consistent	recruitment	during	various	forms	of	self-generated	thought	((Andrews-Hanna	et	al.,	2014;	Fox	et	al.,	2015);	Fig.	1)	and	its	undisputed	role	in	the	default	network	(Buckner	et	al.,	2008;	Yeo	et	al.,	2011),	the	inferior	
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parietal	lobule	does	not	appear	to	be	a	critical	origin	site	for	self-generated	thought.	Two	studies	have	undertaken	fairly	extensive	stimulations	to	the	inferior	parietal	lobule	(Blanke,	Perrig,	et	al.,	2000;	Schulz	et	al.,	2007);	of	more	than	40	stimulations	to	this	region,	only	two	(5%)	elicited	some	subjective	experience	reminiscent	of	self-generated	thought:	whereas	most	stimulations	elicited	simple	sensorimotor	phenomena,	one	elicited	visual	hallucinations	(Schulz	et	al.,	2007)	and	another	a	self-described	‘out-of-body’	experience	reminiscent	of	dreaming	(Blanke,	Perrig,	et	al.,	2000).	Although	these	exceptions	are	intriguing,	given	that	some	95%	of	stimulations	to	inferior	parietal	lobule	have	yielded	no	such	effects	(Fig.	4),	the	safest	conclusion	at	present	is	that	it	should	not	be	considered	as	a	primary	thought	generation	center.	It	is	important	to	note	however	that	‘inferior	parietal	lobule’	designates	a	large	swathe	of	cortex	where	several	networks	meet	one	another	(Yeo	et	al.,	2011),	and	clearly	not	all	of	the	stimulations	reported	here	would	fall	within	the	boundaries	of	the	default	network.	A	more	fine-grained	approach	might	find	that	stimulation	specifically	to	the	default	network	subsection	of	the	inferior	parietal	lobule	results	in	a	higher	rates	of	elicitation	of	self-generated	thought.			
Discussion	and	future	directions		
Caveat:	The	varieties	of	electrical	brain	stimulation		 An	important	caveat	to	all	the	aforementioned	results	and	conclusions	is	that	electrical	brain	stimulation	is	not	uniform:	voltage,	frequency,	duration,	and	other	parameters	can	differ	markedly	across	experiments,	and	sometimes	even	within	the	same	
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patient.	Despite	this	wide	variety	of	stimulation	parameters,	there	is	also	a	fair	degree	of	consistency	in	some	respects	–	for	instance,	the	majority	of	studies	used	50-60	Hz	stimulation	–	but	other	factors,	such	as	the	current	and	duration	of	stimulation,	are	more	variable	(Selimbeyoglu	&	Parvizi,	2010).	These	facts	are	most	relevant	to	our	discussion	of	posteromedial	cortex,	where	null	results	appear	to	be	the	rule	(Foster	&	Parvizi,	2017).	The	apparent	‘silence’	of	posteromedial	cortex	may	not	be	definitive:	varying	stimulation	parameters	(e.g.,	increasing	its	duration	and/or	strength)	in	future	studies	could	conceivably	lead	to	different	(and	positive)	results	in	both	posteromedial	cortex	(Foster	&	Parvizi,	2017)	and	other	brain	areas.		
	
What	is	the	role	of	medial	prefrontal	cortex?		 A	major	lacuna	in	our	knowledge	is	the	role	played	by	the	medial	prefrontal	cortex,	which	has	been	relatively	rarely	investigated	in	terms	of	subjective	effects	in	human	intracranial	patients	(Selimbeyoglu	&	Parvizi,	2010).	Medial	prefrontal	cortex	is	one	of	the	major	hubs	of	the	default	network	(Buckner	et	al.,	2008;	Raichle	et	al.,	2001;	Yeo	et	al.,	2011)	and	is	strongly	recruited	by	essentially	every	form	of	self-generated	thought	examined	to	date,	including	mind-wandering/daydreaming	(Fox	et	al.,	2015),	creative	thinking	(Liu	et	al.,	2015),	and	dreaming	(Domhoff	&	Fox,	2015;	Fox	et	al.,	2013).	Future	studies	elucidating	the	role	of	this	region	are	therefore	critical	to	a	more	complete	understanding	of	the	neural	origins	of	self-generated	thought.	
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The	enigmatic	temporopolar	cortex		 The	high	rate	of	self-generated	thought	elicited	by	stimulation	of	the	temporal	pole	(Fig.	4)	is	an	intriguing	finding	that	should	be	followed	up	with	further	research.	Temporopolar	cortex	remains	a	relatively	little-studied	and	poorly-understood	region,	as	reflected	in	the	title	of	a	recent	comprehensive	review:	‘the	enigmatic	temporal	pole’	(Olson,	Plotzker,	&	Ezzyat,	2007).	However,	anatomists	have	noted	that	its	pattern	of	connectivity	with	other	brain	regions	is	strikingly	similar	to	that	of	the	amygdala	–	another	region	that	appears	central	to	thought	generation	(Fig.	4;	Fox	et	al.,	2016).	This	connectivity	includes	dense	interconnections	with	the	orbitofrontal	cortex,	amygdala,	and	insula	(Gloor,	1997;	Kondo,	Saleem,	&	Price,	2003;	Olson	et	al.,	2007;	Stefanacci,	Suzuki,	&	Amaral,	1996),	often	leading	to	its	grouping	with	medial	temporal	lobe	and	orbitofrontal/medial	prefrontal	cortex	as	a	limbic	or	paralimbic	area	(Mesulam,	2000;	Olson	et	al.,	2007).	Large-scale	investigations	of	intrinsic	resting	state	functional	connectivity	substantially	agree	with	this	conclusion,	grouping	temporopolar	cortex	with	medial	temporal	areas	and	orbitofrontal/medial	prefrontal	cortex	in	a	putative	‘limbic’	network	(Yeo	et	al.,	2011).		Anatomical,	electrophysiological,	and	self-report	data	therefore	all	point	toward	temporopolar	cortex	as	functionally	and	anatomically	related	to	deeper	medial	temporal	lobe	structures.	It	should	therefore	come	as	little	surprise	that	stimulation	of	this	region	likewise	elicits	various	kinds	of	self-generated	thought.	Task-based	functional	neuroimaging	further	supports	these	links:	temporopolar	cortex	recruitment	has	been	reported	in	numerous	independent	fMRI	and	PET	investigations	of	self-generated	thought	(Christoff	et	al.,	2009;	Christoff,	Ream,	&	Gabrieli,	2004;	Dumontheil	et	al.,	2010;	Ellamil	et	
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al.,	2016;	McGuire	et	al.,	1996),	as	well	as	our	recent	meta-analysis	of	these	forms	of	cognition	(Fox	et	al.,	2015;	Fig.	1).		More	detailed	explanations	of	the	temporopolar	cortex’s	function	have	also	been	proposed:		for	instance,	a	large	number	of	fMRI	studies	investigating	mentalizing	and	‘theory	of	mind’	tasks	have	observed	recruitment	of	temporopolar	cortex	(Binder,	Desai,	Graves,	&	Conant,	2009;	Olson	et	al.,	2007),		prompting	the	recent	proposal	that	this	area	may	flexibly	couple	with	other	default	network	components	to	facilitate	these	and	other	social	cognitive	processes	(Spreng	&	Andrews-Hanna,	2015).	One	possibility,	therefore,	is	a	role	in	mediating	the	large	amount	of	social	cognition	known	to	take	place	during	self-generated	thought	(Diaz	et	al.,	2013;	Klinger,	2008).	Given	the	poor	contemporary	understanding	of	temporopolar	cortex,	however,	and	other	proposed	functional	roles	(for	instance,	binding	visceral-affective	assessments	with	highly-processed	perceptual	information	[Olson	et	al.,	2007]),	the	door	should	be	kept	open	to	any	number	of	other	possibilities.		
What	is	special	about	medial	temporal	lobe?			 Although	a	detailed	discussion	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	chapter,	some	features	of	medial	temporal	lobe	circuitry	may	help	in	explaining	the	important	role	played	by	this	region	(Fox	et	al.,	2016).	Whereas	typical	neocortical	circuitry	involves	a	preponderance	of	local	(short-distance)	and	a	corresponding	paucity	of	long-distance	connections	(Douglas	&	Martin,	2004;	Markram	et	al.,	2004;	Thomson	&	Bannister,	2003),	hippocampal	neurons	appear	equally	likely	to	contact	near	and	distant	neighbors	(Buzsaki,	2006;	Li,	Somogyi,	Tepper,	&	Buzsaki,	1992;	Li,	Somogyi,	Ylinen,	&	Buzsaki,	1994).	Given	that	single	neurons	in	
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medial	temporal	lobe	can	encode	very	high-level,	invariant	representations	of	the	world	(for	instance,	highly	specific	famous	faces	or	landmarks;	(Quiroga	et	al.,	2005),	this	specialized	and	densely	interconnected	microcircuitry	might	provide	a	flexible	substrate	for	encoding	novel	and	arbitrary	associations	between	one	percept	or	idea	and	another.	In	the	hippocampus’s	role	as	a	spatial	map,	this	capacity	is	thought	to	be	critical	in	that	it	allows	the	mapping	of	‘anything’	to	‘anywhere’	(Eichenbaum,	Dudchenko,	Wood,	Shapiro,	&	Tanila,	1999;	Ekstrom	et	al.,	2003;	O’Keefe	&	Nadel,	1978)	–	in	principle,	any	known	object	or	person	could	be	set	in	any	known	space	in	the	world,	and	the	medial	temporal	lobe	needs	to	be	able	not	only	to	represent	these	arbitrary	associations	of	object	and	place	in	perception,	but	also	consolidate	them	to	long-term	memory.		If	a	specialized	microcircuitry	indeed	evolved	in	the	hippocampus	allowing	for	the	arbitrary	combination	of	neural	activity	encoding	high-level	percepts	(in	principle	allowing	the	matching	of	any	object	or	person	to	any	spatiotemporal	locus),	this	capacity	could	also	be	‘hijacked’	via	a	process	of	exaptation	–	i.e.,	the	recruitment	or	involvement	of	a	given	structure	in	some	function	other	than	that	for	which	it	originally	evolved	(Gould,	1991;	Gould	&	Vrba,	1982)	–	and	utilized	for	the	self-generation	of	novel/arbitrary	combinations	of	memory	traces.	From	the	subjective	perspective,	the	result	of	this	process	would	be	experienced	as	the	spontaneous	arising	of	thoughts,	sudden	insights	and	creative	ideas,	visual	imagery	and	simulations,	and	even	entirely	sui	generis	spatiotemporal	landscapes	during	what	we	call	‘dreaming’	(Domhoff	&	Fox,	2015;	Fox	et	al.,	2013;	Windt,	2010).	On	this	view,	specific	patterns	of	activity	initiated	in	the	medial	temporal	lobe	would	then	recruit	(or	spread	to)	regions	throughout	the	brain,	likely	in	a	content-dependent	manner.	There	is	some	preliminary	evidence	for	this	kind	of	association	between	medial	
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temporal	lobe	activity	and	that	of	other	brain	regions	during	self-generated	thought.	For	instance,	in	an	fMRI	study	of	mind-wandering,	both	overall	functional	connectivity,	as	well	as	fluctuations	(variability)	in	functional	connectivity,	between	the	medial	temporal	lobe	subsystem	of	the	default	network	and	the	posterior	cingulate	cortex	tracked	self-reports	of	daydreaming	frequency	(Kucyi	&	Davis,	2014).	On	a	finer	timescale,	a	study	using	intracranial	EEG	investigating	spontaneous	memory	recall	found	that	medial	temporal	lobe	structures	showed	the	earliest	peaks	in	high	γ-band	activity,	whereas	γ-band	peaks	were	observed	slightly	later	in	other	areas	throughout	the	temporal,	parietal,	and	frontal	lobes	(Burke	et	al.,	2014).	The	medial	temporal	lobe	was	not	the	only	area	to	show	high-frequency	activity	peaking	prior	to	spontaneous	recall,	but	it	was	the	only	area	where	this	high	γ-band	activity	successfully	predicted	subsequent	memory	recall,	highlighting	its	importance	both	in	initiating	and	predicting	the	success	of	spontaneous	memory	recall	(Burke	et	al.,	2014).	These	findings	suggest	that	spontaneous	memory	recall	might	be	primarily	initiated	or	generated	in	the	medial	temporal	lobe,	followed	by	a	slightly	delayed	but	much	more	widespread	recruitment	of	other	regions	throughout	the	brain	–	similar	to	our	hypothesis	for	spontaneous	self-generation	of	mental	content	other	than	memory.		
Conclusions	and	future	directions	Functional	neuroimaging	has	highlighted	the	importance	of	several	brain	networks	to	self-generated	thought,	most	notably	the	default,	visual,	and	frontoparietal	networks	(Fox	et	al.,	2015),	and	narrowed	down	the	most	likely	initiation/generation	sites	to	somewhere	within	the	default	network	(Ellamil	et	al.,	2012;	Ellamil	et	al.,	2016).	Ultimately,	however,	all	existing	noninvasive	neuroimaging	modalities	lack	the	spatiotemporal	
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resolution	to	answer	subtle	questions	about	where	in	the	brain	self-created	content	is	actually	generated,	as	well	as	how	and	where	this	initial	self-generated	activity	subsequently	spreads	(Fox	et	al.,	2016).	Human	intracranial	electrophysiology,	despite	being	confined	to	clinical	contexts,	has	helped	to	again	narrow	our	focus,	pointing	toward	medial	temporal	lobe	and	temporopolar	cortex	as	especially	relevant	to	thought	generation,	while	simultaneously	pointing	to	an	only	marginal	role	(if	any)	for	other	default	network	hubs,	including	the	posterior	cingulate	cortex	(Foster	&	Parvizi,	2017)	and	inferior	parietal	lobule	(Fox	et	al.,	2016).	Future	work	will	need	to	corroborate,	contest,	and	further	refine	these	coarse	generalizations,	and	understudied	but	potentially	important	regions,	such	as	medial	prefrontal	cortex,	will	need	to	be	more	heavily	investigated.	
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